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What are the effects of resource endowments on state repression? This paper theorizes that
states are more likely to engage in repression to secure resource-rich areas to maximize the state’s
profits, with repression intensity varying by whether the resource requires outside investment to
extract. Should resource extraction require outside investment, states must restrain their repression
and share profits with an external multinational corporation. This theory yields predictions that
there will be higher levels of state repression closer to sites of natural resources, and that overall
levels of repression will be lower in areas with resources that require multinational investment than
in areas with resources that the state can extract with its own capabilities. This is tested using a
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INTRODUCTION
When and how do resource endowments contribute to state repression? Anecdotal evidence suggests
undertheorized variation, as illustrated by the contrasting cases of Nigeria and Zimbabwe. In
Nigeria’s southern Niger Delta region, the site of the state’s oil reserves, grievances regarding the
state’s failure to share the benefits of oil wealth enabled the rise of a mixture of criminal and
insurgent groups. In particular, the rise of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND) in 2006 was marked by an insurgent focus on attacking oil-related facilities and kidnapping
associated personnel (Asuni, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2006). A counterinsurgency campaign
was followed in 2009 by a government amnesty, which led to an increase in oil production, but
failed to prevent the rise of another insurgent group, the Niger Delta Avengers, in 2016 (Ross,
2013; Hallmark, 2017). While the details of this insurgency are more complex (Nwankpa, 2014;
Aghedo and Osumah, 2015), this case is notable for the government attempts to repress and,
when repression was unsuccessful, negotiate with insurgents who were threatening the extraction
of potentially lucrative resources. Despite the ultimately temporary nature of the bargain, this
outcome still sharply contrasts with government action in Zimbabwe. There, the discovery of the
Marange diamond deposits in 2006 was followed by efforts by the national government to exclude
foreign companies from investment in these deposits, in favor of state-owned companies. A diamond
rush was followed by police repression beginning in late 2006, with military units moving into the
area in 2008 and overseeing continued repression and forced civilian labor (Human Rights Watch,
2009).
The contrast of an amnesty in Nigeria with continued repression in Zimbabwe raises a question:
what caused the variation in strategies employed by the state in these two cases? Why did the
government of Nigeria ultimately offer an amnesty while the government of Zimbabwe continued
its repression? More generally, when and how do resources influence a controlling state’s decision
to repress its citizens or restrain itself? In this paper, I develop a theory of state repression as
a means of consolidating control over resource-rich areas with the ultimate aim of profiting from
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those resources. As different kinds of resources require different levels of outside investment from
multinational corporations to extract and thus profit from them, states may restrain their use of
repression with the goal of attracting the necessary outside investment to enable resource extraction
and maximize the profits from these resources. This theory yields two hypotheses that I test
empirically using data on state repression and resource locations. This theory receives support, and
I close with a discussion of potential improvements and extensions for future work.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The study of natural resources and state repression has, over time, become closely linked to a
literature on both internal conflict and the effects of resources on rebellion. While extant work has
naturally focused on geographic factors such as resource location and structural factors such as
economic incentives for engaging in conflict, this review of the literature also highlights undertheorized
elements of this story, particularly with regards to the differing profitability of different resources,
as well as a lack of substantial consideration of the role of multinational investors. I review each of
these aspects of the literature in turn, before closing with a summary of the gaps revealed by this
literature that my theory is intended to fill.
The linkage of natural resources and suboptimal governance outcomes, such as state repression
or civil war, is not necessarily new. Relatively early work such as Le Billon (2001) argued that
resources could become integrated into the political economy of conflicts, as opposing actors attempt
to exploit them, but that specific social processes drive a society’s risk of war due to resources. Ross
(2001), by contrast, generalized by arguing that the resource curse in oil-producing states was due
to rentier state effects; this theoretical development drew on earlier work on state development as
arising from bargaining between tax-seeking governments and citizens whom they wished to tax
(Bates and Lien, 1985). A review of research in this area by Ross (2015) finds that a resource curse
effect exists for petroleum, as its income makes authoritarian regimes more durable while increasing
the probability of some kinds of corruption. Additionally, both petroleum and other resources may
trigger or prolong conflict in low- or middle-income states. However, Ross (2015) notes that there is
a general lack of consensus regarding the precise causal mechanisms behind the resource curse, and
why this literature has relatively strong findings for petroleum but weak or contradictory findings for
other kinds of natural resources. Why these findings differ across resource types remains unexplored,
and this is a gap I seek to remedy with my theory.
There is also a substantial literature on state repression; while earlier work often focused on
assorted state-level predictors of repression, more recent work here has linked natural resources and
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state repression. A general definition of state repression is given by deMeritt: “the threat to subdue
or act of subduing someone by institutional or physical force. Political violence is a particular form
of repression involving the threat to use or actual use of physical force to achieve political goals”
(deMeritt, 2016, p. 2). Notably, she states that “repression and political violence are strategic policies
that governments employ in pursuit of important political and/or military objectives. The most
fundamental of these objectives is the maintenance of control” (deMeritt, 2016, p. 2). This definition
of repression matches well with that of Besley and Persson (2009), who define state repression as
one-sided violence by the state. Early cross-national studies focused on democracy levels, social
inequality, and economic growth as meaningful predictors of state repression (Henderson, 1991;
Davenport, 1995). Later work added nuance to this, noting that the beneficial effects of democracy
may have relatively small effect sizes compared to conflict, either civil or interstate (Davenport,
2004). Additionally, autocratic regimes are not necessarily monolithic in their repression efforts,
with single-party autocracies repressing less than other autocracies (Davenport, 2007b). Davenport’s
work is also notable for proposing the “Law of Coercive Responsiveness,” which argues that state
repression is a response by governments to perceived threats (Davenport, 2007a). Besley and Persson
(2009) identified poverty, rents from natural resources, and weak political institutions as root causes
of political violence; the overlap between these factors and the resource curse literature indicates a
linkage of these two phenomena.
Some scholars have argued that extant work has failed to fully model the strategic nature of
state repression and dissent in the form of popular protests (Pierskalla, 2010). Specifically, Pierskalla
argues that this failure is why tests of the effectiveness of government repression in suppressing
popular protest have found a range of relationships with no clear consensus. Similarly, Ritter and
Conrad (2016) argue that preexisting work on anti-government dissent and government repression
has failed to adequately grapple with their endogeneity, as strategic dissidents and governments
consider each other’s expected responses before acting. To address this, they use rainfall as an
instrumental variable, finding that where states engage in preventative repression, there are no
significant effects of dissent on responsive repression. Additionally, violence may not always be a
successful tool of repression, and has potential to backfire on governments using it (Sutton et al.,
2014). Ritter (2014) elaborates on this by using a formal model to show that the reciprocal nature
of dissent and repression indicates that the same independent variable can have divergent effects.
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She finds that while increased job security for executives decreases the probability of repression
occurring, it increases the severity of any repression that does occur. Finally, Chenoweth, Perkoski,
and Kang (2017) find in a review of both the state repression literature and the more practice-focused
nonviolent resistance literature that regime type conditions scope and intensity of repression, with
states over a democratic threshold much less likely to repress.
Approaching the linkage of resources and contentious politics from a different angle, other
scholars have drawn linkages between resource wealth and its ability to fuel conflict by both
motivating rebellion and potentially funding it. Early work by Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2004)
emphasized the role of economic factors in influencing the viability of engaging in civil war, theorizing
that the lure of economic gains from conflict or the low opportunity costs of engaging in it may
provide sufficient impetus for civil war. These findings were supplemented by country-level analysis,
such as Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) focus on favorable conditions for insurgency as predictors of
civil war. They emphasized the permissive role of a weak central government as well as enabling
factors such as rough terrain and rebel knowledge of a local population sufficiently large to conceal
them. Echoing work on the resource curse, however, the precise causal mechanisms underlying
these findings were initially unclear (Humphreys, 2005). Weinstein (2007) helped to fill this gap,
arguing that resource availability impacted the types of recruits who joined nascent rebel groups,
with resource-rich groups attracting more opportunistic recruits while resource-poor groups were
forced to rely on social endowments. These recruit types then influenced organizational discipline,
ultimately impacting treatment of civilian populations under their control. In a related fashion,
others such as Reno (2002) argued that economically successful actors may respond to the collapse
of the formal state and its patronage networks by becoming well-armed insurgents, with the prospect
of personal economic gain enabling them to recruit individuals who would otherwise have joined
more reformist movements. Similarly, Bates argued that the breakdown of political order (including
the occurrence of civil war) seen in the African context by the close of the twentieth century was
due to the failure of a prior equilibrium bargain between citizens and violence specialists which,
if upheld, supported stable political order (Bates et al., 2002; Bates, 2008). The breakdown of
this bargain, according to this framework, led many elites to perceive violent predation as more
profitable than upholding existing political institutions and bargains.
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Other scholars have used exogenous price shocks to estimate the impact of resources on conflict.
Angrist and Kugler (2008) use an exogenous upward shift in coca cultivation and its price in
Colombia as a natural experiment to test the link between illegal resource cultivation and civil
conflict. They conclude that increased coca growth led to limited economic gains for some actors in
some regions, but also to worsened conditions of violence in those same regions. Other scholars have
also reported similar findings in the Colombian context (Dube and Vargas, 2013; Carreri and Dube,
2017). While this focus on a specific type of resource would appear to threaten generalizability, other
findings have been congruent with this. With regards to oil, scholars find that the discovery of oil
fields can increase the probability of conflict (Lei and Michaels, 2014). Finally, Berman, Couttenier,
Rohner and Thoenig (2017) find that increased market prices for minerals both increase conflict risk
and allow rebel groups to engage in both more and wider-ranging violence by providing a source of
financing.
Finally, there has also been substantial work on the intersection of repression and civil conflict.
This literature has emphasized the relationship between them, showing that state repression can be
both used by the state in an attempt to preemptively suppress potential dissenters, as well as a tool of
conflict should the state face armed rebellion. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) examine
civil war duration and outcome by disaggregating both rebel capacity and state repression, arguing
rebel strength can be disaggregated into offensive and defensive military capabilities, while a state’s
repression ability can also vary by location within a state, with lessened ability at the periphery.
They argue that strong rebels cause conventional-looking conflicts with decisive military outcomes,
while weak rebels can prolong a civil war by hiding at the periphery of the state. Elaborating on
this theme, Danneman and Ritter (2014) find that in response to civil war occurring in neighboring
states, state authorities will engage in preemptive repression to prevent the diffusion of civil war
into their own state, as they anticipate civil war externalities will change the incentives of potential
rebels. They argue that state authorities ultimately repress in an attempt to avoid the fate of
their warring neighbors. Should they fail to prevent rebellion, Fjelde and Hultman (2014) find that
conflict actors such as states may use ethnicity as a collective targeting cue, engaging in violence
against civilians in an attempt to deprive the rebel movement of its civilian support. As such,
states may engage in civilian targeting as a strategic form of repression. Empirical evidence shows
that governments may turn to mass killings as a strategy to remove bases of insurgent support
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(Valentino et al., 2004), while Zhukov’s (2017) historical work finds that the amount of violence
against civilians in German-occupied Belarus was dependent on the extent to which combatants
depended on local or external sources of support.
This review of the literature shows that while resources and violence in the form of state
repression and civil war are linked, with resources increasing both the incentives of rebels to go
to war and their strength once conflict has begun and the incentives of governments to engage in
violence to secure these resources, the strategic use of state repression as it relates to the control of
valuable resources remains an undertheorized area. Throughout this literature, studies of repression
often implicitly treat repression as distributed evenly throughout a state—when the effects of state
repression are considered, the specific locations of that repression are often not taken into account,
meaning that analyses do not explain why states simultaneously engage in repression in one region
but not in another. This leaves undertheorized the question of whether the presence of resources
influences a state’s decision to use repression in a given area. A second, related question concerns
why states vary in their repression. To return to my opening examples, why was there continued
repression in Zimbabwe while Nigeria eventually turned to negotiation? In the next section, I answer
these questions with a theory of resource type variation and government repression incentives.
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THEORY
Given this literature, it seems a reasonable starting assumption that states use internal repression
as a means of consolidating control over territory and any resources it may contain. For the sake
of parsimony, this theory treats the state as a unitary actor. An implicit assumption regarding
repression that applies throughout the rest of this paper, and also forms an important scope condition
of this theory, is that the state’s monopoly on the use of force means that the state is always using
or threatening some level of force against its population (Tilly, 1975). I make no initial assumptions
about the amount or type of repressive force used: a state may use the bare minimum necessary
to enforce its laws via police action, or engage in more draconian repressive action such as mass
killings.
Another important opening consideration is that not all territory contains natural resources of
equal value. Resources are usually not uniformly distributed over a state’s territory, as geological
processes lead to concentrations of minerals or oil in some areas but not others. This haphazard
distribution is compounded by the need to discover natural resources. Previously undiscovered
natural resources can be found by accident or prospecting efforts, introducing a further element of
chance to a state’s known distribution of natural resources as certain resource concentrations may
be overlooked. Additionally, market values for resources are prone to fluctuation, as demonstrated
by global oil markets, leading to variations in value of resources across resource types and over time.
As a state can use internal repression as a means of consolidating control over areas with known
resources within its borders, this implies that the state must have some motive for consolidating
its control. In this theory, I adopt the assumption that states wish to maximize the profits they
accrue from natural resources within their territory. Control of those natural resources is a necessary
prerequisite for that goal, though not necessarily a sufficient condition for it—a point to which I
return below in the discussion of resource types. Here, these starting considerations imply that a
state’s incentives to engage in repression against its citizens will vary by location. While states
may engage in different amounts of repression in different areas for a variety of reasons, such as
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preexisting unrest in one region but not in another, I theorize that holding those other motivations
constant, the presence of exploitable resources of any kind should predict relatively higher levels
of state repression in order to secure the area, and thus those resources, for the direct benefit of
the state. Theoretically, this repressive violence is solely motivated by the state’s desire to secure
the maximum amount of resource profits for itself, and so should not be conditional on the type of
resource under consideration, as all resources have at least some value. Additionally, this indicates
an implicit sharp decline in the explanatory power of this mechanism as the distance between
an incident of repression and the closest site of natural resources increases, as the motivation for
repression due to the presence of a resource should fade as the proximity to that resource diminishes.
This suggests a first, general hypothesis:
 H1: There will be more state repression closer to sites of natural resources.
However, this theory is further complicated by variation in the level of outside investment
from multinational corporations required for the state to enjoy the profits from a given resource.
Some resources may require little or no outside investment before the state can extract and profit
from them, while others may require substantial external investment. In these latter cases, this
requirement for external investment may place these resource profits beyond the reach of the state
by itself (Ross, 2012; Colgan, 2011). However, this access can be facilitated by multinational
corporations committing substantial capital and personnel to extractive ventures. If so, this implies
that a reasonable state lacking such extractive capacity must consider the investment incentives of
such external investors when choosing its actions, including its level of repression—in short, the state
must consider how best to attract investment. This involves a brief consideration of the preferences
of these external investors, a term which I use synonymously with multinational corporations. For
the sake of theoretical simplicity, this theory assumes that these corporations are profit-seeking, but
also wish to avoid substantial risk to their personnel or corporate assets (Bandyopadhyay et al.,
2014), such as physical damages due to popular unrest or outright expropriation of production
facilities by the state’s government. These investors have no fundamental preferences over state
repression or lack thereof—their primary concerns are with the profitability of the venture and the
security of their assets.
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Thus, this kind of external investment is only necessary in cases where resource extraction would
require the provision of large amounts of external investment and expertise, which the state may be
unable or unwilling to provide1. For the purposes of illustration for the rest of this section, and to
match with the later operationalization in my empirical analysis, I conceptualize of this difference in
required investment through reference to two archetypal resources, which are often discussed in terms
of being lootable and not lootable (terms I treat as synonymous with easy- and hard-to-extract):
diamonds and oil. Diamonds are here theorized to require little to no outside investment before
they can be extracted and sold, as they can be mined with relative ease compared to extracting oil
deposits. Oil deposits, by contrast, require substantial investment into the drilling and extraction
infrastructure necessary to both extract the oil and transport it to market. Thus, profits from
diamonds (or other easy-to-extract resources) can be obtained by the state with minimal regard for
outside investors, as they are not necessary for the state to enjoy the profits from these resources.
By contrast, profits from oil reserves (or other hard-to-extract resources) cannot be obtained by
most states, especially those that are still developing, without substantial outside investment.
This variation in the need for outside investment also ultimately solves what at first seems
to be a potentially intractable commitment problem implied by the incentives of this theory: the
clash between the desire of the state to maximize the profits from its resources and the desire of
the firm to maximize its own profits from its investment, given that the state may use repressive
violence to seize control of resources and thus deprive the firm of value. However, so long as the
state requires the expertise of the firm to extract these resources, and thus to derive any substantial
profits from them, the state has differential incentives to repress in resource-rich areas based on
the type of resources: those areas with resources that require outside investment will experience
minimal amounts of repression, as the state must avoid scaring away firms that may fear violent
repression will be used to expropriate their assets, while those areas with resources that do not
require such investment will experience higher amounts of repression as the state can directly seize
resources for itself without fearing a loss of profits.
1This condition covers states at all levels of development: while developing states may lack the funding or human
capital, developed states may not wish to provide such funding if the private sector can assume the costs and risks of
such an operation.
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To summarize, this theory argues that profit-maximizing states, seeking to maximize the
profits from the resources within their territory, face different incentive structures for their choices
conditional on the type of resources they wish to exploit. When considering lootable and easy-
to-extract resources, states have no need to consider whether their behavior will deter potential
investors, as the presence of those investors is not necessary for the state to maximize its profits. As
such, they will be free to engage in repressive violence in these cases to secure these resources. Such
violence will be especially incentivized if the state fears a rebel group is also seeking to control these
resources, and wishes to seize them before a rebel group does. By contrast, if the state is considering
non-lootable resources that are difficult to extract, and thus require the investment of outside firms
to enable their extraction and maximize their profitability, states are aware that investors will be
unwilling to invest in an area where repression or outright civil war would endanger their assets or
extractive efforts. States are aware that they cannot simply seize all profits from these resources for
themselves, but must share them with these outside investors if they wish to gain their cooperation
and thus a share of the profits—that is, they must avoid engaging in repression against investors and
their personnel intended to seize sole control of the resource, which would drive off the investor and
leave the state with no profits. Additionally, if they are facing rebel violence, they may attempt to
pacify the rebellion via negotiation in order to minimize violence. In this case, the state maximizes
its profits by restraining its predation.
This logic suggests, fundamentally, that states will seek to establish ownership via repression
in areas containing resources that do not require outside investment to extract, but will engage in
lower levels of repression in areas with resources that do require outside investment. In this way,
the necessary presence of multinational corporations can incentivize more peaceful outcomes, as
their necessity restrains the state’s level of repressive violence—ultimately, resource type drives
state repression or the lack thereof. This indicates that repression should roughly be a function of
whether states require international investment to profit from their resources: repression will be
lower if they do, and higher if they do not. To restate this in terms of the oil and diamond resources,
this implies that states will engage in less repression in areas containing oil than in those containing
diamonds. This indicates a second hypothesis:
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 H2: Overall levels of repression will be lower in areas containing hard-to-extract resources
than in areas containing easy-to-extract resources.
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METHODS
Testing these hypotheses quantitatively requires both data that reflects the key elements of this
theory and statistical models that can accurately estimate the types of data being used. This implies
several requirements for any research design. First, and most fundamentally, there is a requirement
for data on resource locations and incidents of state repression, as both of these are crucial variables
in the theory. Second, due to the importance of geographic proximity in this theorized relationship
between state repression and resource locations, these data sources must have some embedded
means of providing information on the geographic closeness of these two phenomena. Without some
way of linking the two, any analysis would risk finding spurious relationships between resources and
incidents of repression that were located in different parts of the world. Third, to avoid selection on
the dependent variable, there must be variation in the occurrence of state repression within whatever
unit of analysis is used. Fourth, these data sources must be able to be examined quantitatively.
Fifth, these data must have broad geographic and temporal coverage, as the theory does not bound
itself to specific regions or periods of history. To fulfill these requirements, I combine the civilian
casualty information from incidents of state repression in the UCDP’s Georeferenced Event Dataset
(Sundberg and Melander, 2013) with the Peace Research Institute Oslo’s (PRIO’s) PRIO-GRID
dataset (Strand et al., 2012). This enables me to test my hypotheses using a logit model. In
the following sections, I first describe the data sources from which I created my dataset, before
presenting some descriptive statistics from the dataset. I then present and elaborate upon the
results of the logit model.
The UCDP’s Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander, 2013) covers 1989-2018,
with global (excepting Syria) coverage during that time (Stina, 2019). PRIO-GRID contains
information on the presence of both oil and diamond deposits within the approximately 55 by 55
kilometer grid cells that comprise that dataset, with global coverage for the world’s landmasses
(Lujala et al., 2007; Gilmore et al., 2005; Lujala et al., 2005). From the Georeferenced Event Dataset,
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there is information on the number of deaths from incidents of one-sided violence2 committed
by governments against their civilian population per year within each PRIO-GRID cell, as well
as a binary indicator of whether those occurred during an active conflict-year as defined by the
UCDP3. By construction of the GED, the victims of one-sided government violence are always
civilians; this dataset does not, for example, include combatant deaths from conflict with insurgent
groups, and so there is no concern that other types of violence are being erroneously included in this
analysis. I operationalize state repression as incidents of one-sided violence in this dataset where the
perpetrator was the government. As this dataset was built to be compatible with the PRIO-GRID
dataset, this enables me to generate a cell-year tally of civilian deaths within each cell for each year,
that I then match with the PRIO-GRID cells. Notably, while the Georeferenced Event Dataset has
coverage from 1989-2018, the PRIO-GRID dataset only contains coverage from 1946-2014, with
selected variables within it covering fewer years within that range. My unit of analysis is thus the
grid cell-year.
I include a binary indicator variable for whether a cell-year experienced any violence recorded
in the GED, as some instances of GED violence produced zero fatalities, which would otherwise be
indistinguishable from those cell-years with zero fatalities due to a lack of violence. The PRIO-GRID
dataset also contains numerous useful controls at the cell level. These include the gross cell product
in US dollars at purchasing-power-parity, which is available for all cells for the years 1990, 1995,
2000, and 2005 and originally calculated by Nordhaus (2006). I fill in the GCP for missing years by
filling in a cell’s last known GCP in the following four years, resulting in GCP coverage of 1990-2009.
While this makes the assumption that GCP per year is related to foreign investment at the cell level,
this assumption appears plausible for two reasons. First, it makes conceptual sense, as increased
investment into a cell should increase the amount of capital within a cell as well as potentially
boosting production capabilities, increasing its gross product. Second, extant studies have shown
associations between foreign direct investment and GDP at the national level (Arel-Bundock, 2017).
2Notably, some incidents contained 0 deaths according to the UCDP’s best estimate.
3This binary indicator takes a value of 1 if the grid cell-year experienced any active conflicts as defined by the
UCDP, which are state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence (Stina, 2019). This ensures that this
indicator accurately reflects whether there is any substantial violence occurring in the cell-year, not just whether
one-sided violence was perpetrated by the government during that cell-year, which would prevent the use of this as a
control for civil wars.
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I also include controls for the total population of a cell originally developed by CIESIN (2005),
which are similarly available in five-year intervals from 1990 to 2005 and for which I fill in missing
values in the same way. I include an indicator variable for the presence of lootable diamonds, as
defined by PRIO’s Diamond Resources dataset (Gilmore et al., 2005; Lujala et al., 2005). This
dataset contains locations and dates of both discovery and beginning of production for global
diamond deposits up to 2005. I also include an indicator variable for onshore petroleum deposits,
from the PRIO Petroleum Dataset v.1.2’s onshore locations (Lujala et al., 2007) which covers
petroleum deposits discovered through 2003 (Thieme et al., 2007). Thus, these controls include
only those diamond and petroleum deposits that had a known discovery or beginning of production
date. While it would be optimal if both of these datasets were updated with discoveries through
the present, the fixed geographic nature of natural resource locations should partially mitigate this
concern.
As a result of combining these different variables with difference amounts of coverage over time,
my final data set includes all PRIO-GRID cell-years from 1990 through 2009, with GED event counts
per cell-year matched to their proper grid cells. This dataset meets the requirements established at
the beginning of this section. It includes data on resource locations and incidents of state repression,
while containing a measure of geographical closeness by indicating whether each cell experienced
state violence and contained resources. This limits the potential effects of resources to the area
of the grid cell. Importantly, this dataset also provides variation on several key variables. Most
importantly, there is variation in the dependent variable of state repression, as some cells never
experience repression, while those cells that do experience repression often record different levels of
fatalities. The repression data does record zero deaths in some cases of repression, indicating that it
is not merely capturing instances of lethal repression, alleviating a potential selection concern given
that the theory does not distinguish between lethal and nonlethal repression. There is also variation
in the occurrence of natural resources in any given grid cell. Finally, as elaborated on below, this
dataset can be subjected to quantitative analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
Within my timeframe of 1990-2009, the UCDP’s Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and
Melander, 2013) contains 7,500 incidents of violence perpetrated by 55 distinct governments. The
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Figure 1: Average Fatalities Per Incident By Region
average event of violence has 76.97 casualties per event, but this average conceals substantial
variation in fatalities by region and year. As shown in Figure 1, Africa has the highest average
fatalities, followed by Europe. However, that chart of averages conceals substantial yearly variation
within regions. The series of histograms in Figure 2 shows the summed deaths per year for each
region.
Within the cell-year framework, Figure 3 shows the yearly average number of deaths from GED
events per year across all cells in the dataset. While this indicates averages very close to 0, with
the exception of the year 1994 (which records several instances of mass killings from the Rwandan
Genocide), this average is driven down by a large number of zeros due to a lack of violent events in
16
Figure 2: Summed Deaths by Year by Region
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Figure 3: Average of Civilian Deaths Per Year, All Cells
many cells. To remedy this, Figure 4 shows yearly average civilian deaths, calculated only from
cells in which at least one GED event occurred per year. This figure excludes 1994 due to the
distortionary effects of the Rwandan Genocide; Figure 4.1, which includes the Rwandan Genocide, is
shown in the Appendix. This shows more substantial variation, with the majority of years showing
an average of under 50 deaths. Figure 5 shows that, despite these casualty numbers, the total
number of PRIO-GRID cells containing at least one event of violence per year is quite low, compared
to the total of 64,818 individual cells in my dataset. Finally, Figures 6 and 7 show the average gross
cell product and average cell population for the original years in which they were measured, which
were 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, both of which increase in a roughly linear fashion.
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Figure 4: Average of Civilian Deaths Per Year in Cells with GED Violence
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Figure 5: Yearly Counts of Cells with At Least One GED Event
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Figure 6: Average Gross Cell Product for Years Measured
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Figure 7: Average Cell Population for Years Measured
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Results: Logit Model
I test my hypotheses using a logit model. The dependent variable of the logit model is a binary
indicator of whether an incident of repressive violence occurred within a given grid cell-year. I
operationalize the presence of easy- or hard-to-extract resources through binary variables for the
presence of lootable diamond and oil deposits, respectively, within a given grid cell for a given
year. These enable me to test both of my hypotheses. If the presence of resources increases the
probability of an incident of state repression, this will serve as support for my first hypothesis; thus,
the first hypothesis will be supported if these variables have positive and significant effects on the
probability of repressive violence. By contrast, the second hypothesis will be supported if the effect
of easy-to-extract resources on the probability of violence is positive and greater than the effect of
hard-to-extract resources on that same probability of violence. This model also includes several
control variables. The first is a control for whether the cell-year was experiencing any active conflict,
as defined by the UCDP (Stina, 2019), in order to control for the confounding effects of preexisting
high levels of violence within a cell-year, such as those due to civil war. The second and third are
standard controls for the gross cell product per cell-year and the cell’s population per cell-year, as
described in the previous section. Finally, there is a control for the year.
Analysis: Logit Model
As shown in Table 1, all variables are significant except for the petroleum dummy variable. Addi-
tionally, the indicator variable for the presence of diamonds is positive, as predicted by my first
hypothesis. Figure 8 shows the predicted effects of the presence of diamonds on the probability of
state repression, using the average case approach and holding all other variables at their modes
or means, which were 0 for all of the other binary indicators. This figure shows that the presence
of diamonds does have a large, positive impact on the probability of state repression. While the
substantive increase in the probability of violence is rather small, this is likely due to the low
probability of violence in the dataset in general, as shown above in Figure 5 of the descriptive
statistics. Given this overall low probability of violence, this increase in its probability is still
substantively meaningful. This ultimately provides support for the first hypothesis, as the presence
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Table 1: Logit Model 1 Regression Results
Dependent variable:
Probability of Violence
Active Conflict Dummy 6.310∗∗∗
(0.053)














Akaike Inf. Crit. 21,550.980
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
of at least one of type of resource does increase the probability of repressive violence by a meaningful
amount, relative to the overall probability of violence in the data.
Due to the lack of significance at the p = .05 level for the petroleum dummy variable, this
result does not fully support the second hypothesis. While the positive and significant effect of
lootable diamonds on the probability of state repression is as predicted, the non-significant effect of
petroleum on the probability of state repression is not. While this finding shows that the presence of
lootable resources does increase the probability of state repression in the vicinity of those resources,
which provides support for part of the theory, this failure to find a significant effect for non-lootable
resources indicates that the mechanisms proposed in the theory may be more limited in their scope
than initially assumed.
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Figure 8: Predicted Probability of State Violence using Average Case Approach, with 95% CIs
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
These results provide some support for the theory. The logit model supported the first hypothesis,
due to the strong positive effect of the presence of diamonds on the probability of state repression,
but failed to fully support the second hypothesis. While the lack of more conclusive support for
the theory is disappointing, there are some theoretical and methodological criticisms to consider
before coming to a final verdict on this design. The first is the question of whether a standard
logit model is actually the best model for the count data used to test the second hypothesis. The
small absolute probabilities, due to the high number of zeros in the data, raise the question of
whether a variant that accounts for those zeros is called for, such as a zero-inflated logit. A second
potential criticism, and one that cannot be fixed by changes to the model itself, is that the unit of
analysis may not be fine enough to pick up on the effects of resources. Given that PRIO-GRID
cells are approximately 55 by 55 kilometers, these cells may simply be too large an area, leading
to a failure to detect the true directions or significance of effects. A third potential criticism, this
time focusing on the data, is the need to expand the range and coverage of the resource data, as
the PRIO resource data only covers onshore petroleum deposits discovered through 2003 (Thieme
et al., 2007) and diamond deposits discovered to 2005 (Gilmore et al., 2005), and the PRIO-GRID
resource coding draws from those two datasets. Ideally, future analyses could also incorporate more
than just these two archetypal resources.
In spite of these issues, this analysis can still serve as a useful starting point for future research.
One way in which it can do this is by motivating further refinement of the theory, to account for these
findings. The lack of significance for the petroleum indicator in the logit model, despite the strong
significance for the diamonds indicator, may indicate that different mechanisms are operating for
petroleum resources than for diamond resources—more generally, that resources requiring external
investment differ in some meaningful way from those that do not. While these precise mechanisms
are unclear, future investigations could test this theory for other types of resources, such as precious
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metals, to see if they return similar results. Another avenue of investigation could be the use of
case studies to uncover refinements to the causal mechanisms.
This is not the only potential theoretical development to be suggested by these results. An
alternative direction could involve the strategic decision-making process at the firm level. While firm
preferences are not extensively theorized here, this may benefit from additional specification. One
possibility for expansion involves examining whether firms have preferences over repression—how
much do firms pay attention to state behavior, and what are the conditions under which they do
so? Such an expanded theory could provide insights not only into the effects of state repression but
also potentially into the investment decisions of multinational firms. This could also potentially
lead to models of the strategic interactions of the state and multinational corporations.
Regardless of these potential future developments, however, the partial support for the theory
provides an encouraging sign that this research still contributes a novel meaningful relationship
between some types of resources and state repression. These results suggest that, once both
geography and the need for external investment are accounted for, only easily lootable resources
increase the probability of repressive violence by the state. This indicates that the linkage of
resources and state violence is conditional, in at least some cases, on the geographic locations
of those resources and the absence of requirements for international investment to enable their
extraction. In short, both geographic location and the potential need for international investment
influence the probability of observing a linkage between resources and state repressive violence.
This novel finding ultimately helps to advance knowledge of the relationship between resources and
violence, while providing several potential starting points for future work.
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APPENDIX
Figure 9: Average of Civilian Deaths Per Year
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